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PUNISHING PROPERTY OFFENDERS: DOES MORAL 
CORRECTION WORK? 
Sharona Aharony-Goldenberg* and Yael Wilchek-Aviad** 
“We are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design than 
for correction of the offender or direction of others.” 
 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Chapter 15. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The acknowledgment of the failure of attempts to rehabilitate 
criminals led to the conclusion beginning in the 1970s that “nothing 
works” to reduce recidivism and a shift toward a retributive ap-
proach.1  Adopting the goal of retribution in the penal system has re-
sulted in mass incarceration.2  Indeed, imprisonment is the dominant 
punishment in the United States.3  The punitive approach is also man-
ifest in the penal attitude toward property offenses, which represent 
approximately 12.44% of total offenses in the United States.4  Statis-
tics have shown that incarceration, especially for property offenses, is 
criminogenic.5  There is a high percentage of recidivism among prop-
                                                            
* Lecturer, Netanya Academic College, School of Law. 
**Ariel University, Ariel, Israel. 
1 Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U.L.J. 485, 493, 495 
(1998).  “Doubts about the effectiveness of deterrence have spurred interest in retribution or 
‘just deserts’ as a basis for sentencing white-collar offenders.” Id. 
2 Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Re-
ality in U.S. Prison Programs, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 33, 33-34 (2011). 
3 Martin H. Pritikin, Fine-Labor: The Symbiosis Between Monetary and Work Sanctions, 81 
U. COLO. L. REV. 343, 358 (2010). 
4 Crime in the United States 2010, F.B.I., http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl29.xls (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).  “Property 
crimes are offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.” Id.  In this 
essay we interpret property offenses more broadly to include white collar crime. 
5 Roy D. King, Prisons and Jails, in PENOLOGY AND CRIM. JUST. 17 (Shlomo Giora Shoham, 
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erty offenders in the United States where 82.1% of property offenders 
have been arrested for a new crime within five years of release,6 and 
73.8% within three years, the highest rates among all offenses.7 
The incentive is strong to determine what works to reduce 
reoffending rates among property offenders.  To find a solution to the 
high rates of recidivism among property offenders, it is necessary to 
examine the roots of property crimes, which in our opinion lie in the 
defective moral reasoning of property offenders, in other words, in 
their flawed moral judgment.  Laurence Kohlberg, who formulated 
thetheory of moral development, drew attention to the connection be-
tween delinquency and low moral standards.8  In the wake of his the-
ory on moral reasoning, dozens of empirical studies have confirmed 
the connection between low moral development and delinquency.9  
Similar results point to the low level of moral reasoning of property 
offenders.10 
Although in the psychological and criminological academic 
arenas the link between low moral level and delinquency has been 
acknowledged, the legal academic field has paid little attention to 
moral development and the moral correction of offenders.  Criminal 
law still adheres to its classic goals, namely retribution, rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, and deterrence.11  Also, this lacuna is true regarding 
the possible correction of the low moral judgment of property offend-
ers. 
This paper examines ways in which the sentencing process 
                                                                                                                                          
Ori Beck & Martin Kett eds., 2008); Lynne M. Veritas, Tomislav V. Kovandzic & Thomas 
B. Marvell, The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: Evidence from State Panel Data, 6 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 589, 607, 614 (2007). 
6 Matthew H. Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns 
from 3005 to 2010, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf. 
7  Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME JUST. 115, 129 (2009). 
8 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
MORAL DEV. (1981); ANNE COLBY ET AL., Theoretical Introduction to the Measurement of 
Moral Judgment, in I THE MEASUREMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT, 1, 15-16 (1987) [hereafter 
COLBY & KOHLBERG]. 
9  Beth Judy & Eileen S. Nelson, Relationship Between Parents, Peers, Morality and Theft in 
an Adolescent Sample, 83 HIGH SCH. J. 31 (2000); Jerry L. Tatum & John D. Foubert, Rape 
Myth Acceptance, Hypermasculinity, and SAT Scores as Correlates of Moral Development: 
Understanding Sexually Aggressive Attitudes in First-Year College Men, 50 J.C. STUDENT 
DEV. 195, 201 (2009); Geert Jan Stams et al., The Moral Judgment of Juvenile Delinquents: 
A Meta-Analysis, 34 J.ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 697, 708 (2006). 
10  See Judy & Nelson, supra note 9. 
11 Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 
1203, 1204 (2011). 
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can induce the moral correction of property offenders, and thus, low-
er recidivism.  Part I explores the connection between morality and 
delinquency.  Next, it refers to Kohlberg’s theory of moral develop-
ment.  It introduces empirical evidence showing that moral reasoning 
can be acquired through various methods of intervention, especially 
through Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT), which has been shown to 
considerably lower recidivism rates.  Part II describes the main penal-
ties used in cases of property offenses in the U.S. 
In view of the connection between moral judgment and prop-
erty offenses, and of the fact that moral reasoning can be acquired so 
as to affect delinquent behavior and lower recidivism, Part III pro-
poses to re-adopt the long-forgotten goal of criminal law, which is the 
moral correction of property offenders, and to espouse pro-moral cor-
rection sanctions.  It analyzes the existing penalties from a moral 
point of view and suggests that financial sanctions, such as fines and 
restitution, support moral correction because property offenders may 
conceive them as fair and dignified.  Part IV presents the suggested 
penal approach aimed at achieving the moral correction of the proper-
ty offenders.  It suggests that the sentence should incorporate manda-
tory MRT. 
Note that Gilligan criticized Kohlberg’s analysis for not tak-
ing into account women’s moral orientation, claiming that longitudi-
nal studies of women’s moral judgments are necessary in order to 
validate his theory and that female notions of morality entail different 
reasoning.12  Indeed, most of the following statistical data relate to 
male offenders.  Consequently, the article refers only to male offend-
ers and uses the suitable terminology. 
II. MORAL REASONING AND PROPERTY OFFENSES 
A. Defining Morality 
Although morality is a common term, it is difficult to define.  
In order to be able to raise offenders’ morality, it is important to un-
derstand what induces a moral behavior.  When referring to a moral 
act, Kohlberg emphasizes cognition.13  According to Kohlberg, jus-
                                                            
12 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self and of Morality, 47 
HARV. EDUC. REV. 481, 515 (1977). 
13 Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Development and Identification, in CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 277, 
278 (Harold William Stevenson ed., 1963). 
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tice, the primary regard for the value and equality of all human be-
ings, is the central principle to the development of moral judgment.14 
Conversely, when defining morality, Hoffman emphasizes 
feelings, rather than a cognitive process.  He also considers empathy 
with the potential victim to be at the core of morality.  In his view, 
empathy is defined as the vicarious affective response to another per-
son.15  The key requirement of an empathetic response is the in-
volvement of psychological processes that induce a person to have 
feelings that are more congruent with another’s situation than with 
his own.16  He adds that moral reasoning or judgment may also be in-
volved, although not necessarily.17  Moreover, Hoffman holds that 
empathy can be aroused when observers imagine the victims, when 
they read about others’ misfortunes, or even when they make Kohl-
bergean judgments about hypothetical moral dilemmas.18  Similarly, 
Pizzarro argues that emotions, specifically empathy, play an integral 
role in the process of moral judgment: “the capacity to experience 
empathy and the ability to regulate it efficiently are necessary in or-
der to be a moral individual.”19 
According to Gibbs, these two notions, justice and empathy, 
complement one another and must be considered together for a com-
prehensive understanding of moral development.20  In other words, 
                                                            
14 Lawrence Kohlberg, A Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education, in 
COLLECTED PAPERS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL EDUCATION 95 (1973); Lawrence 
Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization – The Cognitive-Developmental Approach, in 
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 40 (Thomas 
Lickona ed., 1976). 
15 MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CARING 
AND JUSTICE 29 (Cambridge Universtity Press eds., 2000); M. L. Hoffman, Empathy, Social 
Cognition & Moral Action, in HANDBOOK OF MORAL BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT, Vol. I. 
275, 276 (W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz eds., 1991). 
16 MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CARING 
AND JUSTICE 30 (Cambridge Universtity Press eds., 2000). 
17 M. L. Hoffman, Empathy, Social Cognition & Moral Action, in HANDBOOK OF MORAL 
BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT, Vol. I 275, 276 (W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz eds., 1991). 
But cf. WILLIAM ICKES, EMPATHIC ACCURACY 29 (DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1997), who de-
fines empathy as the cognitive awareness of another person's internal states, that is, his 
thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and intentions. 
18 MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATION FOR CARING 
AND JUSTICE 91 (Cambridge University Press eds., 2000). 
19 D. Pizarro, Nothing more than Feelings? The Role of Emotions in Moral Judgment, 30 
JOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 355, 371-72 (Alex Gillespie & Doug Por-
pora eds., 2000). 
20 JOHN C. GIBBS, MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND REALITY: BEYOND THE THEORIES OF 
KOHLBERG AND HOFFMAN 238 (Oxford University Press eds., 3d ed. 2003); see also MARTIN 
L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CARING AND JUSTICE 
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the desire to act morally, “moral motivation,” can arise both from the 
cognitive construction of a situation as unjust and from the empathic 
response to the victim’s pain and suffering.21  This integrative line of 
thought has been adopted throughout the present paper. 
B. Delinquency and Morality 
Kohlberg described three universal levels of moral develop-
ment: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional.  These 
stages identify the level at which a person regards other people, inter-
prets their thoughts and feelings, and sees their role or place in socie-
ty.22  Theorists of the cognitive-developmental tradition have argued 
that a person’s level of moral development affects his ability to resist 
the temptation to behave immorally.23  For example, Palmer and Hol-
lin suggests that male delinquents have significantly poorer moral 
reasoning than non-delinquents, and that delinquents have value defi-
cits in their moral reasoning.24  Similarly, according to Raaijmakers 
et al., moral reasoning predicts rule-violating behavior in both ado-
lescence and adulthood.25  Similar conclusions have been reached 
with regard to juvenile offenders.  A comprehensive meta-analysis 
conducted by Stams et al. reveals a significantly lower stage of moral 
judgment in juvenile delinquents than in their non–delinquent peers, 
                                                                                                                                          
6 (2000) (stating that empathy and reasoning about justice are linked from early stages in the 
moral development of children). 
21 JOHN C. GIBBS, MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND REALITY: BEYOND THE THEORIES OF KOHLBERG 
AND HOFFMAN 7 (2003) (claiming that moral perception can be profound in understanding 
and empathic in feeling). 
22 Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization – The Cognitive-Developmental Ap-
proach, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR:  THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES 
172 (Thomas Lickona ed., 1976). 
23 S. L. Ward, Moral Development in Adolescence, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOLESCENCE 
663 (Vol. I) (1991), as reported in Judy & Nelson, supra note 9. 
24 Emma J. Palmer & Clive R. Hollin, A Comparison of Patterns of Moral Development in 
Young Offenders and Non-offenders, 3(2) LEGAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 232 
(1998). 
25 Quinten A. W. Raaijmakers et al., Delinquency and Moral Reasoning in Adolescence and 
Young Adulthood, 29 INT’L J. OF BEHAV. DEV. 247, 255 (2005); see Jerry L. Tatum & John 
D. Foubert, Rape Myth Acceptance, Hypermasculinity, and SAT Scores as Correlates of 
Moral Development: Understanding Sexually Aggressive Attitudes in First-Year College 
Men, 50 J. OF C. STUDENT DEV. 195 (2009) (finding that as respondents' level of rape myth 
endorsement increases, assessed levels of moral development decrease); see also Wilson C. 
Goodwin & K. Beck, Rape Attitude and Behavior and Their Relationship to Moral Devel-
opment, 9 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 85 No. 1 (2002) (finding levels of moral development 
and rape myth endorsement were likewise significantly and negatively correlated in a sample 
of Australian men convicted of rape). 
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even after controlling for socioeconomic status, culture, gender, age, 
and intelligence.26  Likewise, Brugman and Aleva matched delin-
quent youths in a detention center with students from a local high 
school and found that the high school sample had significantly more 
advanced moral reasoning.27  Moreover, Nisan claims that a concep-
tion of moral identity creates moral commitment, that is, if an indi-
vidual identifies himself as moral he will behave morally.28 
C. Moral Reasoning and Property Offenses 
Delinquents are divided into subgroups based on the nature, 
seriousness, and motivation of their anti-social acts.  They also differ 
in their moral judgment.29  For example, Kohlberg and Freundlich 
found that delinquents whose offenses were related to using drugs 
showed a higher stage of moral judgment than “regular” delin-
quents30  Therefore, it is important to pay special attention to the 
connections between property offenses and moral development. 
Research has shown a connection between property offenses 
and low moral reasoning.  For example, Beth et al. found an associa-
tion between self-reported theft and a low level of morality.31  Like-
wise, Greenberg found that the chances of workers at the convention-
al morality level to steal from their employer are relatively lower than 
                                                            
26 Geert Jan Stams et al., The Moral Judgment of Juvenile Delinquents: A Meta-Analysis, 34 
J. OF ABNORMAL CHILD. PSYCHOL. 697, 708-10 n.5 (2006). 
27 Daniel Brugman & Elisabeth A. Aleva, Developmental Delay or Regression in Moral 
Reasoning by Juvenile Delinquents?, 33 J. OF MORAL EDUC. 321, 334 n.3 (2004); But see 
Richard J. Petronio, The Moral Maturity of Repeater Delinquents, 12 YOUTH SOC’Y 51, 55 
n.1 (1980) (finding that recidivist juvenile delinquents showed higher moral judgment scores 
than juvenile delinquents who were not returned to court within two years after being first 
placed on probation). 
28 Mordecai Nisan, Personal Identity and Education for the Desirable, 25 J. OF MORAL 
EDUC. 75 n.1 (1996). 
29   Geert Jan Stams et al., supra note 26, at 708. 
30   L. Kohlberg & D. Freundlich, Moral Judgment in Youthful Offenders, (Unpublished man-
uscript) (1973), as reported in Geert Jan Stams et al., The Moral Judgment of Juvenile De-
linquents: A Meta-Analysis, 34 J. OF ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 697, 700 n.5 (2006). See 
Jennifer G. McCarthy & Anna L. Stewart, Neutralisation as a Process of Graduated Desen-
sitisation: Moral Values of Offender, 42 INT’L OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMP. 
CRIMINOLOGY 285 (1998). 
31 See Judy & Nelson, supra note 9 (analyzing data of a sample of 83 male and 92 female 
high school students and the relationships between attachment to parents, morality, peer 
theft, and self-reported theft, and adolescents reporting involvement in burglary achieved 
significantly lower morality scores than those who reported no involvement in burglary in 
the preceding year). 
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those of workers at the pre-conventional moral level.32  Similar find-
ings were reported in connection with tax crimes: honesty prevents 
treating tax evasion as a simple portfolio decision.33  Likewise, 
LaLumia & Sallee demonstrated that many taxpayers have a “sub-
stantial inclination toward honesty, and that an unwillingness to cheat 
is an important component in the prevention of tax evasion and per-
haps of crime more generally.”34 
Palmer and Hollin researched the moral reasoning of non-
offenders and of offenders convicted mainly of property offenses.  
They found that delinquents show less mature moral judgment than 
their non-delinquent peers.35  Thus, it may be concluded that offend-
ers commit property crimes mainly because of a moral defect. 
D. Raising the Level of Moral Reasoning 
Empirical evidence suggests that moral reasoning can be ac-
quired through various methods of interventions.  Also, changes in-
duced in moral judgment affect delinquent behavior and lower recid-
ivism rates.  For example, a meta-analysis conducted by Little 
showed that MRT36 has lowered re-arrest and re-incarceration rates 
by about 20-35% relative to the rates observed in non-treated offend-
ers, and it reduced short-term recidivism by at least 50%.37  These 
findings match, to some extent, a meta-analysis by Wilson et al., at-
testing to the positive effect of cognitive-behavioral programs 
(CBT)38 for offenders, and showing that MRT studies indicate 42% 
                                                            
32 Jerald Greenberg, Who Stole The Money, and When? Individual and Situational Determi-
nants of Employee Theft, 89 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &  HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 985, 
997 n.1 (2002). 
33 James P. F. Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputation Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 33 
EUR. ECON. REV. 797, 804 (1989) (referring to morality as equivalent to honesty). 
34 Sara LaLumia & James M. Sallee, The Value of Honesty: Empirical Estimates from the 
Case of the Missing Children, 20 INT’L TAX AND PUB. FIN. 192, 193-94 n.2 (2013). 
35   Palmer & Hollin, supra note 24, at 225-32 n.2. 
36 MRT incorporates cognitive elements into a behavior-based program that stresses moral 
reasoning.  The goals of MRT are to enhance the social and moral behavior of offenders, and 
its theory is based on the ideas of Kohlberg’s moral development theory. Chris Hansen, 
Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions: Where They Come From and What They Do, 72 FED. 
PROBATION 43 n.2 (2008). 
37 Gregory L. Little, Meta – Analysis of Moral Recognition Therapy: Recidivism Results 
from Probation and Parole Implementations, 14 COGNITIVE BEHAV. TREATMENT REV. 14, 17 
(2005). 
38 “Cognitive-behavioral therapists seek to learn what their clients want out of life (their 
goals) and then help their clients achieve those goals.  The therapist’s role is to listen, teach, 
and encourage, while the client’s role is to express concerns, learn, and implement that learn-
7
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recidivism rates for treated populations, as opposed to 58% for the 
untreated.39 
By contrast, Reasoning and Rehabilitation (R&R) is a CBT 
program for offenders.  It does not focus on moral reasoning, but is 
based on the theory that offenders suffer from social and cognitive 
deficits. 40  This program was found to be less effective than MRT.41 
Leeman et al. found a multi-component group treatment pro-
gram for anti-social youths that includes social skills training, anger 
management, moral education (EQUIP), and stimulated substantial 
behavioral gains.42  They also found that the effect of the program 
was evident twelve months after participants’ release from jail: the 
15% recidivism rate of the EQUIP group was approximately half that 
of the control groups six months after release, and slightly over one-
third at twelve months.  The authors noted that this pattern suggests 
that the result of the treatment is stable, and that without treatment 
the likelihood of recidivism increases. 
Likewise, an extensive meta-analysis of intervention studies 
aimed at increasing moral judgment competence in delinquent and 
non-delinquent preadolescents and adults yielded consistently medi-
um-to-large effect sizes.43  Conversely, Rest found that it is difficult 
to raise the average moral judgment scores of any group by interven-
tion.  Although he pointed out that interventions lasting several 
months with explicit and heavy emphasis on moral reasoning are 
more likely to produce change.44 
III. EXISTING PENALTIES FOR PROPERTY CRIMES 
Generally, the U.S. federal sentencing mechanism in property 
offenses is based on three groups of penalties: incarceration, mone-
                                                                                                                                          
ing.” What is CBT?, NACBT, http://www.nacbt.org/whatiscbt.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 
2016). 
39 David D. Wilson et al., A Quantitative Review of Structured, Group-Oriented, Cognitive-
Behavioral Programs for Offenders, 32(2) CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 172, 198-99 (2005). 
40 Hansen, supra note 36, at 64. . 
41 WILSON, supra note 39, at 198. 
42 Leonard W. Leeman et al., Evaluation of a Multi-Component Group Treatment Program 
for Juvenile Delinquents, 19(4) AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 281, 288-99 (1993). 
43 G. Lind, Ist Moral lehrbar? Ergebnisse der modernen moralpsychologischen Forschung 
[Can Morality Be Taught? Research Findings from Modern Moral Psychology] (2002) [In 
German], as quoted in Geert Jan Stams, Daniel Brugman, Maja Deković, Lenny van 
Rosmalen, Peter van der Laan, John C. Gibbs, The Moral Judgment of Juvenile Delinquents: 
A Meta-Analysis, J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 697, 709 (2006). 
44  James R. Rest, Morality, in HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 597 (1983). 
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tary sanctions, and intermediate sanctions (community service and 
community restitution centers). 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelinesset out a uniform sentenc-
ing policy relating to imprisonment for convicts ofproperty offenses. 
45  The average imprisonment sentence for property offenses is be-
tween 23 to 30 months.46  However, as mentioned in the Introduction, 
incarcerating property offenses is “criminogenic.”47  Below we de-
scribe in more depth the monetary and intermediate sanctions. 
A. Economic Sanctions 
The economic sanctions discussed below consist of fines, dis-
gorgement, and restitution. 
1. Fines 
Under the federal system, fines are not recognized as a sepa-
rate, noncustodial sentencing option, in contrast to many state guide-
line systems.  According to the federal system, fines can be imposed 
only as part of probation, intermediate, or confinement sanction.48  
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines set fines within minimum and 
maximum bounds, according to the level of the offense; the court is 
to impose a fine in all cases, except when the defendant establishes 
that he or she is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay 
any fine.49  In determining the amount of the fine, the court must also 
consider among others,the need for the combined sentence to reflect 
the seriousness of the offense (including the harm or loss to the vic-
tim and the gain to the defendant).  The sentence must also promote 
respect for the law, provide just punishment, and afford adequate de-
terrence.50  In some cases, the fine is greater than the gain caused by 
                                                            
45 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
46 Average sentence length for § 2b1.1 offenders (theft, property destruction, and fraud) 
(2009-2014); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 33 
(2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-
sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2014-Quarter-Report-1st.pdf. 
47 R. D. King, Prisons and Jails, in PENOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 17 (S. G. Shoham et 
al. eds., 2008); L. M. Vieraitis, T. V. Kovandzic & T. B. Marvell, The Criminogenic Effects 
of Imprisonment: Evidence from State Panel Data, 1974-2002, 6(3) Criminology & Public 
Policy 589 (2007). 
48 Nora V. Demleitner, Smart Public Policy: Replacing Imprisonment with Targeted 
Nonprison Sentences and Collateral Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 339, 343 (2005). 
49 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2 (2013). 
50 § 5E1.2(d) (2013). 
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the misconduct.51 
Generally, the revenue derived from fines is paid to the 
Treasury (the state) rather than to the victims.  The Victims of Crime 
Act 1984 (“VOCA”) established the Crime Victims Fund, making 
possible the distribution of some funds collected from fines paid by 
defendants to deserving victims of crimes.  Most states have a body 
that reviews and distributes compensation funds and grants to eligible 
victims.52 
2. Disgorgement 
Disgorgement is the mandatory transfer of the total profits or 
gain from some illegal or criminal conduct from the wrongdoer to the 
government.53  The amount varies, at the discretion of the court, 
based on the facts of the case.  Disgorgement can be imposed in addi-
tion to other penalties.54  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines express-
ly address disgorgement as part of the sentencing and probation pro-
cess of organizations.55  Disgorgement typically applies when 
restitution or remedial efforts cannot be part of a sentence because 
there is no identificable victim, such as in the case of money launder-
ing.  In S.E.C.  v. First Jersey Securities, Inc.,56 the court held that the 
purpose of disgorgement is to prevent a wrongdoer from profiting by 
his or her illegal conduct.57 
3. Restitution 
Restitution58 owed to victims of crime is regarded as a critical 
part of American criminal sentencing.  Restitution is defined in the 
Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), which re-
                                                            
51 JAMES T. O'REILLY ET AL., PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME – LEGAL PENALTIES FOR 
CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY VIOLATIONS 182 (2009). 
52 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601; 42 U.S.C.A. § 10602. 
53 O'REILLY ET AL., supra note 51, at 183. 
54 O'REILLY ET AL., supra note 51, at 183. 
55 U.S.S.G. § 8C2.9 (stating, “the court shall add to the fine determined under § 8C2.8 (De-
termining the Fine within the Range) any gain to the organization from the offense that has 
not and will not be paid as restitution or by way of other remedial measures”). 
56 101 F.3d. 1450 (2d Cir. 1996). 
57 Id. 
58 Richard C. Boldt, Criminal Law: Restitution, Criminal Law, and the Ideology of Individu-
ality, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969 n.2 (1986) (stating, “strictly speaking, the terms 
‘restitution’, ‘reparation,’ and ‘compensation’ are neither interchangeable nor overlapping”). 
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quires courts to impose restitution to victims of offenses against 
property, including victims of fraud and deceit.59  Most often, restitu-
tion is ordered in cases of property crime such as home burglary in-
volving stolen or damaged property or the theft of goods from a retail 
store.  It is also commonly ordered in cases of theft of services (e.g., 
cab or restaurant bills), fraud, and forgery.60 
The victim is defined as “a person directly and proximately 
harmed as a result of the commission of an offense.”61 This definition 
applies to the United States itself, as well as government entities.62  
Restitution is a punishment to be included in a defendant’s sentence, 
together with incarceration, fines, and other penalties that the law al-
lows.63  Restitution payments take priority over fines.64  Restitution 
may also be ordered as a discretionary condition of probation and su-
pervised release for any offense.65  If the defendant fails to make res-
titution, his or her supervised release is revoked, and the defendant is 
returned to prison to serve additional time.66 
The court may order the return of property to the victim, and 
                                                            
59 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(1).  Mandatory restitution to victims of certain crimes states that 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant . . . the court shall 
order, in addition to, or in the case of a misdemeanor, in addition to or in lieu of, any other 
penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution.” Id.  The mandatory provi-
sions also apply in plea agreements. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c)(1); For other discretionary 
powers to impose restitution see also O'REILLY ET AL., supra note 51, at 185-86.. 
60.David Beatty et al., Rights and Services for the 21st Century (1998), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/directions/pdftxt/direct.pdf. 
61 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(2).  The main exception to mandatory restitution is for offenses 
against property with respect to which the court makes a finding from facts on record that 
either (a) the number of identifiable victims is so large that restitution is impracticable or (b) 
determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victims’ losses 
would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide res-
titution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process. 18 U.S.C. § 
3663A(c)(3). 
62 United States v. Lincoln, 277 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Senty-Haugen, 
449 F.3d 862, 865 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Shana Schmidt, No. 11–1911 (2012).  Beat-
ty recommended that when a victim cannot be identified to receive restitution, judges should 
consider ordering payment to a national, state, or local victim assistance or compensation 
program.  Beatty, supra note 60. 
63 Melanie D. Wilson, In Booker's Shadow: Restitution Forces a Second Debate on Honesty 
in Sentencing, 39 IND. L. REV. 379, 396-97 (2006). 
64 O'REILLY ET AL., supra note 51, at 192. 
65 18 U.S.C.A. § 3563(b)(2) (West 2008).  In this context, restitution expires with the term of 
parole or supervision. 
66 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3583(e)(2) (West 2015), 3613A(a)(1) (West 1996), 3614(a) (West 
1996) (noting that if a defendant knowingly fails to pay restitution, he or she may be re-
sentenced to any sentence that might originally have been imposed); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 
3583 (West 2015) (explaining supervised release after imprisonment). 
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if such return is “impossible, impracticable, or inadequate,” payment 
of an amount equal to its value.67  The court may order reimburse-
ment to the victim for lost income, transportation, and other expenses 
related to the “participation in the investigation or prosecution of the 
offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.”68  In 
Hughey v. United States,69 the court held that a defendant may be or-
dered to make restitution only for losses proximately resulting from 
the offenses for which he is convicted and not for additional losses.70  
Therefore, pain and suffering may not be compensated for through 
MVRA. 
MVRA makes restitution mandatory in the full amount of 
each victim’s losses, regardless of the defendant’s economic circum-
stances.71  As a practical matter, however, a defendant who lacks re-
sources or the potential to earn money may be “unlikely to ever make 
meaningful restitution to the victim” of a crime.72  States have uti-
lized “creative methods of monitoring and collecting restitution” be-
cause of the reluctance of offenders to pay their restitution.73  Sources 
of restitution payments now include “inmates’ work wages, trust ac-
counts, state and federal income tax returns, lottery winnings, and in-
heritances.”74  Despite “the passage of federal and state legislation, 
restitution remains one of the most underenforced victim right[s] 
within the criminal and juvenile justice systems.”75 
It has often been stated that the goal of mandatory restitution 
is rehabilitation: “While restitution serves the obvious function of 
compensating crime victims, its primary goal is the rehabilitation of 
the criminal.”76  Similarly, in United States v. Twitty,77 the court rec-
ognized that restitution is a “criminal penalty meant to have strong 
deterrent and rehabilitative effect.”78  Furthermore, in United States v. 
                                                            
67 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(1)(B) (West 2012). 
68 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(4). 
69 495 U.S. 411 (1990). 
70 Id. at 413. 
71 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (West 2002). 
72 The Restitution Process for Victims of Federal Crimes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 
2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ian/VW-pamphlet/Restitution.pdf, at 1. 
73 Beatty, supra note 60, at 73. 
74 Beatty, supra note 60, at 73.  
75 Beatty, supra note 60, at 216.  
76 People v. Goulart, 224 Cal. App. 3d 71, 78 (1990).  
77 107 F.3d 1482 (11th Cir. 1997). 
78 Id. at 1493 n.12 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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Brown,79 the court held that restitution can be a useful step toward 
rehabilitation.80  Thus, the courts regard the payment of restitution as 
a means to achieve moral rehabilitation of the offenders.  This is a 
noteworthy position, given that the goal of rehabilitation is tradition-
ally held to be occupational or psychological, rather than moral. 
B. Intermediate Sanctions 
Intermediate sanctions fall between standard probation and 
incarceration.  They include boot camps, work camp programs, and 
electronic monitoring.  A common intermediary sanction is commu-
nity service, which requires convicted offenders to perform unpaid 
work for the benefit of the community.81  This sanction does not nec-
essarily entail restitution.82 
The various intermediate sanctions also include community 
residential facilities and restitution centers, which are community-
based residential programs for recently released inmates and selected 
offenders under the supervision of state departments of correction.83  
The facilities provide around-the-clock supervision of non-violent of-
fenders.84  Offenders remain in restitution centers from three to 12 
months, although courts have sentenced offenders for as long as 24 
months.85  The program offers job placement and budgeting skills 
development, vocational and educational training through linkages to 
community-based employers and providers, substance abuse treat-
ment, and other services that promote personal responsibility, self-
improvement, and public safety.86  Some of the centers require man-
                                                            
79 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984). 
80 Id. at 909. 
81 GILL MCIVOR, SENTENCED TO SERVE: THE OPERATION AND IMPACT OF COMMUNITY 
SERVICE BY OFFENDERS 1 (1992). 
82 For a review of additional sanctions, such as probation or compelled community service, 
see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 24 (6th ed. 2012).  
83 Also called “Probation and Restitution Centers (PRC),” James R. McDonough et al., Sub-
stance Abuse Report Community Programs, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2005), 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/subabuse/probation/04-05/execsum3.html. 
84.BELINDA RODGERS MCCARTHY & BERNARD O. MCCARTHY, COMMUNITY-BASED 
CORRECTIONS 130 (1984) (stating that Georgia operates several community restitution cen-
ters, known as diversion centers, where probationers live while they complete court-ordered 
restitution).  
85 Marcus Nieto, Community Correction Punishments: An Alternative to Incarceration for 
Nonviolent Offenders, CAL. ST. LIBR. (May 1996), 
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/96/08/#RTFToC17.  
86 McDonough, supra note 83.  
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datory employment or payment to cover daily expenses.87  A unique 
feature of the centers is that all earnings are surrendered directly to 
the center to pay restitution.  The centers provide a resource for par-
ticipants who have difficulty meeting their court-imposed financial 
obligations to victims.88  Recidivism among participants in restitution 
centers is low: recommitment rates for those who complete the pro-
gram are 14% at the two-year and 30% at the six-year follow up 
marks.89  Similarly, data from the Michigan Law Enforcement Infor-
mation Network concluded that within the 46-month study, only 41% 
of probationers were re-arrested, approximately half for property 
crimes.90 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Moral Correction as a Goal of Criminal Law 
We noted above the connection between moral judgment and 
property offenses, whereby the offender’s low level of moral judg-
ment lies at the root of his disregard for the property of others.91  If 
moral reasoning can be elevated to affect delinquent behavior,92 sen-
tencing should aim at elevating the moral judgment of property of-
fenders.  In other words, the goal of criminal law should be the moral 
correction of offenders in general, and of property offenders in par-
ticular.  This idea, although novel in the modern legal analysis of the 
goals of criminal law, is ancient and has been supported throughout 
the ages by some of the greatest philosophers.  Thomas Hobbes noted 
that “we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design 
than for correction of the offender or direction of others.”93  Similar-
ly, Plato stated that punishment should aim to make the offender hate 
                                                            
87 Nieto, supra note 85.  
88 McDonough, supra note 83; Nieto, supra note 85. But compare with a 1975 study of resti-
tution centers where most of the residents had been convicted of property offenses and 85% 
of the participants were rearrested within 18 months of release. Steve Chesney et al., Re-
search on Restitution: A Review and Assessment, in 61 JUDICATURE 348, 351 (1978). 
89 McDonough, supra note 83.  
90 Nieto, supra note 85. 
91 See Part I.C, supra (explaining the connection between property offenses and moral de-
velopment). 
92 See Part I.D, supra (discussing various methods used to raise the level of moral reason-
ing).  
93 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch.15 (1651).  
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injustice and embrace true justice.94  To conclude, the sentence could 
play an important role in elevating the property offenders’ moral 
judgment if it adopted a pro-moral correction approach.  To explain 
the concrete meaning of the notion “pro-moral correction sanctioning 
approach” in property offenses, this article analyzes property offenses 
from a moral perspective and derives from this analysis the funda-
mental notions of moral sentencing. 
1. A Moral Analysis of Property Offenses 
A moral analysis of property offenses shows that they harm 
both the direct victim and society as a whole.  The harm inflicted up-
on the direct victim consists of loss of property, the pain caused by 
the crime (fear, distress, shock, etc.) and the breach of the victim’s 
right to property.  The social harm caused by property crimes is more 
complex.  First, they reduce the general social feeling of safety.  Se-
cond, they cause enormous expenditure on policing, prosecution, and 
adjudication.  Third, they interfere with the social order: if an offend-
er can seize the rightful property of others, rightful ownership be-
comes insecure and not profitable.  Fourth, adopting an Aristotelian 
line of thought, property crimes violate social equality: honest people 
work in order to earn money, whereas property offenders collect the 
fruits of others’ labor.95  Pro-moral sanctions are therefore intended 
to achieve moral correction through the imposition of just sanctions 
and the promotion of the delinquent’s empathy with the victim (mo-
rality as justice and empathy).96 
2. Moral Correction in Property Offenses: 
Fundamental Principles 
Below are the fundamental principles that are necessary in or-
der to attain justice and empathy at the sanctioning phase. 
First, the sanction should aim to induce empathy toward the 
victim because of the endured harm and pain.  This may be achieved 
by the offender having to experience pain similar to the one he 
caused: parting with the gains derived from the offense and with his 
                                                            
94 PLATO, THE LAWS bk. XI, at 328 (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin Books 1970) (c. 360 
B.C.E.). 
95 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 275 (G.P. Goold ed., H. Rackham trans., Har-
vard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1926) (c. 384 B.C.E) (“[T]he unjust being . . . the unequal.”).  
96 See Part I.A.1, supra (discussing the economic sanction of fines).  
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own property, confronting the harm caused by his offense, and work-
ing (in order to understand that the gains were the fruit of work un-
dertaken by the victim). 
Second, the punishment should aspire at achieving justice, as 
described below.  The sanction should be conceived as just and digni-
fied in the offender’s eyes, to prevent the bitterness and rancor on the 
part of the offender against the penal system.  It should promote per-
sonal responsibility and self-improvement.  A fundamental principle 
of moral rehabilitation is the strengthening of the offender’s ability to 
respect the law by assuming responsibility for his actions and for 
their repair.  The sanctions should also be proportional to the just de-
serts of the offender that is, with the wrong committed, and should 
reflect the amount of harm done.  There should be a conceptual con-
nection between the harm caused by the offense and the criminal 
sanction.  In other words, if the offender misappropriated someone’s 
property, he should return it or an equivalent sum.  This type of eco-
nomic tit-for-tat ensures equivalent retaliation, in which the offender 
is punished in a way that is similar to his misconduct: in his pocket. 
The sanction should also make sure that the wrongdoer does 
not derive any benefit from the criminal conduct, and that he should 
not be allowed to retain the fruits of his offense, that is, the victim’s 
assets.  Leaving the stolen property in the offender’s hands signals 
the triumph of crime and strengthens the erroneous belief that crime 
pays.  According to Gary Becker, “illegal activities would not pay.”97  
The sanction should also correct financially the personal and social 
harm resulting from the property offense, thereby improving the of-
fender’s moral judgment.  The basic principles of corrective justice 
are found in Aristotle’s words: 
For it makes no differencewhether a good man has de-
frauded a bad man or a bad one a good one, . . . the 
law looks only at the nature of damage, treating the 
parties as equal, and merely asking whether one has 
done and the other suffered injustice, whether one in-
flicted and the other has sustained damage.  Hence the 
unjust being here the unequal, the judge endeavors to 
equalize it: . . . the linerepresenting the suffering and 
doing of the deed is divided into unequal parts, but the 
                                                            
97 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in 76(2) JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 44 (1968). 
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judge endeavors to make them equal by the penalty or 
losshe imposes, taking away the gain.98 
Thus, while the equal is a mean between more and 
less, gain and loss are at once both more and less in 
contrary ways, more good and less evil being gain and 
more evil and less good loss; and as the equal, which 
we pronounce to be just, is, as we said, a mean be-
tween them, it follows that Justice in Rectificationwill 
be the mean between loss and gain.99 
Traditionally, “[t]he Aristotelian theory of corrective justice” 
is viewed as an aim of tort law; however, this doctrine is all the more 
relevant to criminal law: if correction of the harm done makes sense 
when the injury was committed recklessly, a fortiori it makes sense 
when the harm was done deliberately, in a criminal context.100  This 
view is supported by other legal scholars who write about property 
offenses.101  For example, Barnett supports criminal restitution based 
on the claim that it leads to the correction of the imbalance created by 
the offense and to corrective justice: “The idea of restitution is actual-
ly quite simple.  It views crime as an offense by one individual 
against the rights of another.  The victim has suffered a loss.  Justice 
consists of the culpable offender making good the loss he has 
caused.”102 
Note that the sentencing process should perhaps inflict some 
additional pain on the offender to serve notice that he does not only 
return to the point of departure but must endure additional punish-
ment for his wrongful acts.  This line of thought is echoed in the 
words of Plato, who states that a thief ought to pay not only restitu-
tion but face additional punishment in order to deter him and others 
from committing injustice: 
When a man does another any injury by theft . . . for 
                                                            
98 ARISTOTLE, supra note 95, at 275  
99 ARISTOTLE, supra note 95, at 275. 
100 Sharon Aharony-Goldenberg & Yael Aviad-Wilchek, Property Offences – An Economic 
Punitive Model, 32 IUNEI MISHPAT 189, 213 (2010) (in Hebrew); see also Sharon Aharony-
Goldenberg & Yael Aviad-Wilchek, Restitution: A Multilateral Penal Approach, TRENDS 
AND ISSUES IN VICTIMOLOGY 100 (Natti Ronel et al. eds., Cambridge Scholars 2008).  
101 PATRICIA HUGHES & MARY JANE MOSSMAN, RE-THINKING ACCESS TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN CANADA: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF NEEDS AND RESPONSES 75–76 (2001). 
102 Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, in ASSESSING THE 
CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 287 (Randy E. Barnett & 
John Hagel eds., 1977). 
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thegreater injury let him pay greater damages to the 
injured man, and lesser for the smaller injury; but in 
all cases, whatever the injury may havebeen, as much 
as will compensate the loss.  And besides the compen-
sationof the wrong, let a man pay a further penalty for 
the chastisement of hisoffence: he who has done the 
wrong instigated by the folly of another,through the 
lighthearted ness of youth or the like, shall pay a light-
erpenalty; but he who has injured another through his 
own folly, when overcomeby pleasure or pain, in cow-
ardly fear, or lust, or envy, or implacableanger, shall 
endure a heavier punishment.  Not that he is punished 
becausehe did wrong, for that which is done can never 
be undone, but in orderthat in future times, he, and 
those who see him corrected, may utterlyhate injus-
tice, or at any rate abate much of their evil-doing.103 
Bentham reaches a similar conclusion, based on different rea-
sons: “To enable the value of the punishment to outweigh that of the 
profit of the offense, it must be increased, in point of magnitude, in 
proportion as it falls short in point of certainty.”104 
B. Moral Analysis of the Penalties of Property 
Offenders 
Below we analyze penalties imposed on property offenders 
(imprisonment, intermediate sanctioning, and monetary sanctions) in 
moral terms, and inquire whether they represent pro-moral correction.  
The moral evaluation of the penalties is based on both theoretical ar-
guments and on recidivism rates as a means to test whether they en-
hance moral judgment. 
1. Imprisonment and Moral Correction 
Analysis of incarceration from a moral point of view proves 
that it plays a limited role in achieving empathy and justice.  Impris-
onment appears not to achieve empathy because during his prison 
                                                            
103 PLATO, supra note 94, at 328. 
104.JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
143-44 (Kitchener 2000) (1781), 
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/bentham/morals.pdf.  
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stay the offender is not confronted with the pain endured by the vic-
tim, but rather surrounded by other offenders who disregarded their 
victims’ pain.  Furthermore, incarceration also appears to play a lim-
ited role in achieving justice.  First, it does not provide financial cor-
rection of the social harm resulting from the property offense; on the 
contrary, confinement entails heavy social economic costs that are 
shouldered by the taxpayers.105  Holding each prisoner costs the tax-
payers between $20,000 and $30,000 a year.106  Bentham opposes in-
flicting punishment in several cases, including “where it is unprofita-
ble, or too expensive: where the mischief it would produce would be 
greater than what it prevented.”107 
Second, imprisonment seems to cultivate, rather than correct, 
the property offenders’ tendency to exploit others, because during 
their confinement property offenders are freely provided with all their 
basic material needs at the expense of the taxpayer.  Third, at times 
custody is conceived as unjust, non-proportional, and dehumanizing 
in the eyes of the offender,108 which may lead to bitterness and 
vengefulness on his part.109  Fourth, the imposition of incarceration 
without restitution, compensation, and fines may mistakenly lead the 
offender to the conclusion that he has paid his debt to society.  Thus, 
it is highly improbable that incarceration would elevate the moral 
judgment of property offenders.  110   This conclusion is supported by 
the extremely high recidivism rates among property offenders: 82.1% 
within five years of release.111 
                                                            
105 King, supra note 5, at 20.  
106.MARY K. STOHR & ANTHONY WALSH, CORRECTIONS: THE ESSENTIALS 112-13, 128-29 
(2012) (discussing these rates are higher for women, juveniles, and the elderly).  
107 BENTHAM, supra note 104, at 134. 
108 Drew Leder, Imprisoned Bodies: The Life-World of Incarcerated, 31 SOC. JUST., Nos. 1-
2, at 51, 64 (2004). 
109 Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis 
of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 486-87 
(1997); E. Rotman, Beyond Punishment, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 285 (R. A. Duff & 
David Garland eds., 1994); see also Christopher Wildeman et al., The Hedonic Consequenc-
es of Punishment Revisited, 104(1) J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 140-42 (2014) (discuss-
ing that incarceration decreases happiness). 
110 See Alvin J. Bronstein, Incarceration as a Failed Policy, 67 CORRECTIONS TODAY 6 
(2005) (“Prisons . . . are still ineffective, corruptive and criminogenic.  It is widely recog-
nized by criminologists and corrections professionals that we have locked up too many so-
cial nuisances who are not real threats, and too many petty offenders and minor thieves, sev-
ering the few social ties that they have and pushing them toward more serious criminal 
behavior.”).  
111 Alexia D. Cooper et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns 
from 2005 to 2010, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
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It may be argued that, besides the achievement of the goal of 
incapacitation, incarceration is intended primarily to achieve the goal 
of retribution: that it is an expression of vengeance and outrage 
against the criminal act.  Bibas, for example, noted that “Our criminal 
procedures . . . allow the community to vent its outrage, satisfying the 
public’s sense of justice by bringing catharsis and closure.”112  But 
this catharsis seems to be futile because it is temporary and lasts only 
until the next probable re-offense.  It also appears to lead to public 
frustration, as taxpayers spend enormous amounts of money on pris-
ons to which property offenders return soon after their release. 
2. Intermediate Sanctions and Moral Correction 
a. Moral Analysis of Community 
Service 
Moral analysis of community service reveals that it is moder-
ately effective in producing moral correction of property offenders.  
On the one hand, it is possible to argue that community service pro-
vides some justice, as the offender works for the community he has 
harmed.  Indeed, Pritikin enumerates the many benefits of communi-
ty-based labor (typically unpaid) and generally relevant to restitution 
centers: 
[C]ommunity-based labor] avoids the high costs of in-
carceration. Community service also has the potential 
to help reintegrate the offender into society and build 
his self-esteem, and thereby rehabilitate him.  Paid la-
bor lacks this rehabilitative panache, but it does pro-
vide a number of practical benefits: it avoids idleness 
which can lead to misconduct; it provides skills and 
experience which increase the offender’s employabil-
ity and so reduce the risk of recidivism; and it gener-
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4986 (April, 22, 2014); see also Jeffrey 
Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 304 (1991) (finding 
that prisoners given more severe punishment had a higher recidivism rate); see also David 
Weisburd et al., Specific Deterrence in a Sample of Offenders Convicted of White-Collar 
Crimes, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 587 (1995) (finding that white-collar criminals sentenced to prison 
were more likely to relapse than those who were not imprisoned). 
112 Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Proce-
dure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1392 
(2003).  
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ates revenue which can be used to reimburse the state 
for criminal justice and corrections costs, compensate 
victims, and support the offender’s dependents.113 
On the other hand, community service does not correct the fi-
nancial harm done to the direct victim.  It does not offer any specific 
means of relating to the pain endured by the victim, but rather focus-
es on a vague retributive idea of paying off the offender’s debt to so-
ciety.  Recidivism rates among offenders performing community ser-
vice is quite high: 66.4% within four years114 and 63.4% within three 
years after sentencing.115  Similarly, 43% of participants in a New 
York three-borough sample have been arrested again within 180 days 
of being sentenced to community service,116 and 75% of the re-arrests 
were for property offenses.117 
b. Moral Analysis of Restitution 
Working Centers 
Generally, restitution centers play an important role in effect-
ing moral correction among property offenders.  They serve justice 
because they focus on the financial correction of the harm done to the 
victim, and at the same time provide concrete means for the offender 
to work in order to earn a living and to make restitution.  Because the 
program also provides services that promote personal responsibility, 
self-improvement, and public safety,118 it can be argued that it oper-
ates as a type of moral intervention.  Furthermore, it contributes to 
the achievement of empathy, because it signals to the offender that 
money is earned by work rather than by theft or fraud, and because it 
causes the offender to endure the pain of having to part from the 
fruits of his labor in order to pay restitution, giving him an opportuni-
ty to identify with his victim’s ordeal.  Pritikin noted that work en-
sures that “no offender is ‘judgment-proof,’ so that substantial fines 
can be imposed and restitution becomes more than an empty ges-
ture.”119 
                                                            
113 Pritikin, supra note 3, at 346-47. 
114  MCIVOR, supra note 81, at 154. 
115 MCIVOR, supra note 81, at 154. 
116.DOUGLAS CORRY MCDONALD, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT WALLS: COMMUNITY SERVICE 
SENTENCES IN NEW YORK CITY 166 (1986).  
117 Id. at 170.  
118 McDonough, supra note 83. 
119 Pritikin, supra note 3, at 348. 
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Recidivism among participants in restitution centers is low: 
recommitment rates for those who complete the program are 14% at 
the two-year, and 30% at the six-year follow up marks.120  Similarly, 
data from the Michigan Law Enforcement Information Network show 
that only 41% of probationers were re-arrested within the 46-month 
time frame of the study, nearly half for property crimes. 
3. Monetary Sanctioning and Moral Correction 
The second sentencing notion is monetary sanctioning, which 
consists of restitution, disgorgement, and fines.  Empirical data show 
that both fines121 and restitution122 are effective in reducing recidi-
                                                            
120 McDonough, supra note 83.  
121 It is difficult to find statistics concerning the imposition of fines, and almost impossible to 
find such data relating specifically to property offenses.  Some relatively old or international 
data are available on the subject.  According to the 2013 U.K. Compendium of Re-offending 
Statistics, relating to fines for offenses such as shoplifting, driving over the limit, etc., the 
one-year reoffending rate for offenders receiving a fine in 2010 is around 40%. 2013 Com-
pendium of Re-offending Statistics and Analysis, MINISTRY OF JUST., 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/278133/comp
endium-reoffending-stats-2013.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).  Reconviction rates in Scot-
land of offenders receiving fines fluctuate between 30-32% in the one-year follow-up studies 
and 43-45% in the two-year follow-up studies.  Note that this rate is lower than the average 
reoffending rates for other sanctions. Reducing Reoffending: Review of Selected Final Report 
for Audit Scotland Report, THE SCOTTISH CENTRE FOR CRIME AND JUST. RES., 
http://www.sccjr.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Reducing-Reoffending-FINAL-Dec-
2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).  A slightly less clear picture is drawn in a meta-
analysis that “compared the effects of conditional sentences, fines, determinate imprison-
ment, training school imposed on young law-breakers aged 18 to 20 years” and imprison-
ment.  The authors cited 11 comparisons that show significantly better outcomes for non-
custodial sanctions; 14 studies, that showed no significant difference, although results were 
somewhat more favorable to non-custodial sanctions in four cases; and two studies that show 
significantly lower reoffending rates following custodial sanctions. Patrice Villettaz et al., 
The Effects of Custodial vs. Non-Custodial Sentences on Re-Offending: A Systematic Review 
of the State of Knowledge, CAMPBELL COLLABORATION, 
 http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/download/108/  ( last visited Mar. 30, 2016).  Older 
research produced similar results.  An examination of recidivism rates in the Netherlands 
found that they varied greatly.  For example, “the proportion of recidivists among those sen-
tenced to an unconditional fine was 32%; among those with conditional custodial sentences 
combined with an unconditional fine it was 35%; and among those sentenced to uncondi-
tional imprisonment it was 60%.” C. van der Werff, Recidivism and Special Deterrence, 21 
BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 136, 141 (1981).   
122 Furthermore, ordering the offender to restore stolen goods and to compensate the victim 
may advance his rehabilitation and thus prevent reoffending. ANDREW. R KLEIN, 
ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND PROBATION 156-57 (2d ed. 
1997).  Various studies have shown that restitution programs lower recidivism rates: 
Chesney et al., supra note 88, at 131-48; Anne L. Schneider, Restitution and Recidivism 
Rates of Juvenile Offenders: Results from Four Experimental Studies, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 533 
(1986); Anne L. Schneider & Peter R. Schneider, The Impact of Restitution on Recidivism of 
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vism.  These encouraging figures can be explained in moral terms, 
and economic sanctions appear to have great value in enhancing the 
moral judgment of property offenders because they help achieve em-
pathy and justice for several reasons. 
a. Achieving Empathy through 
Monetary Sanctions 
Restitution is an important tool for enhancing the property of-
fender’s empathy with the pain endured by his victims, albeit less so 
than are fines and disgorgement.  First, by having to part with the 
gains obtained through his offense the offender experiences pain sim-
ilar to the one he caused.  In the case of fines, he must also part with 
some of his own property.  Second, the offender must confront the 
harm caused by his offense, which can be accomplished by exposing 
him to the Victim Impact Statement at the sentencing stage.  These 
statements describe the manner in which the crime has affected the 
victim.  This reasoning is echoed in the words of the Supreme Court 
in Kelly v. Robinson,123 emphasizing the rehabilitative aspect of resti-
tution: 
Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty be-
cause it forces the defendant to confront, in concrete 
terms, the harm his actions have caused.  Such a pen-
alty will affect the defendant differently than a tradi-
tional fine, paid to the State as an abstract and imper-
sonal entity, and often calculated without regard to the 
harm the defendant has caused.  Similarly, the direct 
relation between the harm and the punishment gives 
restitution a more precise deterrent effect than a tradi-
tional fine.124 
                                                                                                                                          
Juvenile Offenders: An Experiment in Clayton County, Georgia, 10 CRIM. JUST. REV. 1 
(1985); Roy Sudipto, Juvenile Restitution and Recidivism in a Midwestern County, 59 FED. 
PROB. 55–62 (1995).  Petersilia and Turner suggested that the recidivism of offenders who 
paid restitution, received counseling, held jobs, and performed community service was 10-
20% lower than that of offenders who did not. Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Evaluating 
Intensive Supervision Probation/Parole: Results of a Nationwide Experiment, NAT’L INST. 
OF JUST. RES. IN BRIEF, 7-8 (May 1993).  
123 479 U.S. 36 (1986). 
124 Id. at n.10.  Carolyn Robinson pleaded guilty to larceny in the second degree.  The charge 
was based on her wrongful receipt of $9,932.95 in welfare benefits.  The court placed Robin-
son on probation for five years.  As a condition of probation, the judge ordered her to make 
restitution to the State of Connecticut at the rate of $100 per month.   Robinson filed a volun-
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Third, McCarthy and McCarthy noted that restitution provides 
offenders with a means of expressing guilt for their conduct: “such 
feeling may become more manageable because the offender is able to 
do something constructive following his offense, rather than repress-
ing whatever remorse he may feel and attempting to rationalize his 
behavior . . . . .  Some therapists view the acknowledgement of re-
sponsibility that is required in restitution as a prerequisite for offend-
er change.”125  This line of thought also seems relevant to fines and 
disgorgement. 
b. Attaining Justice through Monetary 
Sanctions 
First, whereas imprisonment may be conceived by property 
offenders as harsh and unjust, economic sanctions can easily be con-
ceived as fair and dignified, which could prevent the bitterness and 
rancor on the part of the offender against the penal system.  At the 
same time, Wood and May found that a non-custodial sanction is 
deemed more onerous than a custodial sanction.126 
Second, economic sanctions ensure that a wrongdoer does not 
derive any economic benefit from his criminal conduct.127  Converse-
ly, in the absence of restitution or disgorgement, the lawbreaker re-
tains the spoils, leaving the injured party deprived. 
Third, economic sanctions are proportional to the just deserts 
of the offender, that is, with the wrong that was perpetrated.  Fur-
thermore, according to McCarthy and McCarthy, the humanitarian 
benefits of restitution are closely linked to their rehabilitative objec-
tives, because restitution is related to the offense committed.  This 
type of personalized justice is not possible when only imprisonment 
is imposed.  In the view of the authors, making punishment more 
meaningful should promote the goals of rehabilitation because the of-
fender comes to view the criminal justice system as responding to his 
particular behavior.128 
                                                                                                                                          
tary petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court and made no further payments.  She also 
sought a declaration in the Bankruptcy Court that the restitution obligation had been dis-
charged.  The court held that a bankruptcy debtor cannot discharge her criminal restitution 
obligations in bankruptcy proceedings.   
125 MCCARTHY & MCCARTHY, supra note 84, at 135. 
126 Peter B. Wood & David C. May, Racial Differences in Perceptions of Severity of Sanc-
tions: A Comparison of Prison with Alternatives, 20 JUST. Q. 627 (2003).  
127 United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). 
128 MCCARTHY & MCCARTHY, supra note 84, at 134. 
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Fourth, restitution and disgorgement play an important role in 
attaining justice because they assist to some extent in restoring vic-
tims to their situation before the wrongdoer’s action (corrective jus-
tice).  This line of thought is echoed, to some extent, in Bentham’s 
words: 
To furnish an indemnity to the injured party is another 
useful quality in a punishment.  It is a means of ac-
complishing two objects at once - punishing an of-
fense and repairing it; removing the evil of the first 
order, and putting a stop to alarm.  This is a character-
istic advantage of pecuniary punishments.129 
Pritikin noted that unlike most other punishments, restitution 
provides tangible benefits to victims.130  Some of these merits are 
summarized by O’Reilly et al.: 
Legal remedies, such as fines, and equitable remedies, 
such as restitution, work together to address multiple 
policy objectives.  Disgorgement and restitution are, in 
an important sense, a form of restorative justice, not 
penal justice.  Victims are compensated, the balance of 
society is restored, law-abiding companies are not dis-
advantaged, and justice is served if we know that the 
wrongdoer didn’t get to keep any of their ill-gotten 
gains and the victims were made whole. 131 
The payment of fines by the offender to the Treasury is a form 
of redress for the harm caused to society, for the general feeling of 
insecurity caused by the property offense, and for social costs, such 
as policing expenses, involved in bringing the offender to justice.132  
Barnett describes the breach of equality amended in this way: 
A crime creates an imbalance between a criminal and 
his victim, or, according to some accounts, between a 
criminal and an aggregation referred to as ‘society.’  
Justice consists of ‘getting even’ - that is, restoring the 
balance between the offender and either the victim, 
                                                            
129 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 339 (Etienne Dumont trans., 4th ed. 1931) 
(1882). 
130   Pritikin, supra note 3, at 346. 
131 O'REILLY ET AL., supra note 51, at 183. 
132 NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE 
PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 125-26 (1990). 
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society, or both.  Where restitution and retribution dif-
fer is with respect to how this balance should be ob-
tained . . . .  [A] restitutive account focuses not on the 
desert and punishment of the criminal, but on the right 
of the victim to be made whole. It would compel a 
criminal to make reparations - often, but not necessari-
ly, consisting of monetary compensation - to raise the 
victim up to some semblance of her ex ante posi-
tion.133 
c. Problematic Aspects of Monetary 
Sanctions 
Two criticisms may be raised against the analysis of financial 
sanctions, based on moral terms.  First, restitution, disgorgement, and 
fines alone are somewhat limited in their ability to achieve justice 
and to raising the moral judgment of the offenders, because they do 
not compensate victims for the emotional distress, pain and suffering, 
and fear and anguish they endured.134  Compensation of victims for 
the pain and suffering inflicted by the offender is rare among U.S. 
sanctioning measures,135 but we believe that it is a necessary element 
in the redress of harm done. 
Second, the offender may lack the economic resources neces-
sary for the payment of fines and restitution orders, which may result 
in reoffending and thus obstruct moral rehabilitation.136  MVRA has 
been criticized for not taking into account the offenders’ inability to 
pay and, as a result, creating a large surge in criminal debt.137  This 
situation is exacerbated when the restitution order is combined with 
                                                            
133 Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime, 
76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 159 (1996). 
134.See Restitution, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
https://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-
victims/restitution (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); see also Lucia DiCicco, The Rights of Victims 
in United States Criminal Proceedings and at the ICC, AM. NON-GOV’TAL ORGS. COAL. FOR 
THE INT’L CRIM. CT. (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.amicc.org/docs/VictimsUS.pdf (“Most 
states have a body that reviews and distributes compensation funds and grants to eligible vic-
tims.”). 
135.See About Victims’ Rights, VICTIM LAW, https://www.victimlaw.org/victimlaw 
/pages/victimsRight.jsp (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
136 MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 132, at 114. 
137 Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1693-95 (2009). 
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imprisonment, distancing the convict from possible sources of em-
ployment and income that he needs for obeying the order.138  There-
fore, some occupational assistance is needed in conjunction with fi-
nancial sanctions. 
V.  MORAL CORRECTION: THE DESIRED PENAL APPROACH 
Research indicates that often the property offender’s low level 
of moral judgment lies at the root of the crime.139  Therefore, the 
main goal of criminal law should be to elevate and correct his moral 
reasoning.  Federal law, state law, and the courts should adopt a pro-
moral correction approach by incorporating the following elements in 
the sentencing: mandatory participation in MRT, moral analysis of 
the offense, moral correction of the offender, and pro-moral correc-
tion sanctioning. 
A. Mandatory MRT 
As noted, empirical research has shown that participation in 
moral education interventions, especially MRT, elevates moral rea-
soning and lowers recidivism.140  Therefore, participation in moral 
interventions should be a mandatory part of the sanction.  Palmer and 
Hollin, for example, suggest that “interventions aimed at changing 
moral reasoning should be directed at raising levels of moral reason-
ing in these areas.”141 
B. Moral Analysis of the Offense 
To achieve moral correction, the verdict should stress the na-
ture of the wrong committed.  It is important that the judge analyze 
the immorality of the offense by adopting a terminology that includes 
both justice and empathy. 
For example, if the offender stole a ring, it is preferable that 
the judge emphasizes the pain endured by the victim who was strong-
ly attached to it, the breach of the victim’s right to property, the injus-
tice committed by the crime that deprived the victim of the fruit of 
her labor, and so forth.  Similarly, if the case is one of tax evasion, 
                                                            
138 Id. at 1705-07. 
139 Palmer & Hollin, supra note 24, at 225. 
140 Little, supra note 37, at 14-17. 
141 Palmer & Hollin, supra note 24, at 225. 
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which is a form of property offense that harms society as a whole, the 
judge should point out its consequences, including, the numerous vic-
tims (taxpayers) who must therefore shoulder a heavier tax burden 
and the reduced state budget that can now pay for fewer social bene-
fits. 
C. Pro-Moral Correction Sanctions 
We suggest the mandatory imposition of the following 
financial sanctions: restitution, fines, and compensation as a means to 
elevate moral reasoning.142  These sanctions help the offender 
empathize with the pain and loss endured by the victim by forcing 
him to confront the consequences of his action and experience similar 
pain when parting with his own property.  They also help the 
offender recognize in a concrete way the damage he has caused when 
he experiences a similar shortage of money, and assist him in 
assuming responsibility for repairing the damage he caused.143 
The combination of these sanctions also helps in achieving 
justice because it makes sure that crime does not pay.  Moreover, 
they impose an additional payment on the offender in the form of 
fines intended to compensate society for its general loss and to serve 
as an additional deterrent to wrongdoers.144  Furthermore, they 
correct the harm caused to the victim by the payment of restitution 
and compensation (for pain and suffering).145  Pritikin argued, 
“Restitution is thought to help rehabilitate offenders by providing 
them a way to make amends.”146  Therefore, compensation should be 
added to the existing sanctions in order to achieve full corrective 
justice.  This notion was embraced by Beatty et al., who 
recommended that full restitution should include, “when appropriate, 
compensation for pain and suffering.”147  Note further that the 
imposition of the combination of these sanctions is not as expensive 
                                                            
142 See Aharony-Goldenberg & Aviad-Wilchek, supra note 100, at 213; see also Nora V. 
Demleitner, Smart Public Policy: Replacing Imprisonment with Targeted Nonprison Sen-
tences and Collateral Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 339, 356 (2005) (“Other offenders consti-
tute no risk to public safety but deserve a substantial sentence. For them, a combination of 
fines, restitution, and community service may be most effective.”). 
143 Aharony-Goldenberg & Aviad-Wilchek, Property Offences, supra note 100, at 213.  
144 MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 132, at 116. 
145 Beatty et al., supra note 60, at 233. 
146 Pritikin, supra note 3, at 346.  
147 Beatty et al., supra note 60, at 243. 
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as incarceration,148 but rather assists the Treasury, because the 
income from the fines is collected by the state, so that they are neither 
unprofitable nor too expensive.149 
We argue that the combination of these financial penalties can 
elevate the offenders’ moral judgment and thereby reduce reoffend-
ing.  The fact that imposition of these financial sanctions results in 
relatively low recidivism rates of around 40% attests to the fact that 
they achieve the goal of moral correction. 
In cases in which the offender cannot meet the demands im-
posed on him by the financial sanctions or lacks the necessary work-
ing skills, confinement in restitution centers should be imposed to fa-
cilitate the payment of the monetary sanctions.  The offender should 
remain in the restitution centers until the full restitution of the stolen 
amount is made, up to a maximum of years determined by a judge.  
Notwithstanding the numerous merits of work sanctions outside of 
prison, they are rare,150 and therefore we strongly recommend ex-
panding their use. 
Conversely, imprisonment, and to a lesser extent community 
service, do not help correct the wrong moral reasoning of the proper-
ty offender.  Moreover, incarceration may further degrade the offend-
er’s low moral level because it involves parasitic behavior, a criminal 
environment, and the mistaken perception that the offender’s debt to 
society has been paid.  Therefore, it is not surprising that in practice 
both incarceration and community service lead to high reoffending 
rates of up to 80%, especially among property offenders.  We believe 
that incarceration should be a last-resort penalty, imposed only rarely, 
especially when there is strong public outrage against the offender or 
when the likelihood of moral rehabilitation is extremely low – for ex-
ample, if the offense was committed for ideological reasons or when 
there is evidence that the convict might escape from an open work 
setting. 
D. The Proposed Sanctioning Approach and Possible 
Criticism 
The proposed sanctioning approach adds a new goal to the ex-
                                                            
148 Pritikin, supra note 3, at 422 (establishing that fine-labor is cheaper to administer than 
prison but more expensive to administer than probation, even if we factor in full-wage subsi-
dy). 
149 MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 132, at 130. 
150 Pritikin, supra note 3, at 347. 
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isting goals of criminal law: that of moral correction.  It may be ar-
gued, however, that this goal clashes with the important aim of retri-
bution, which is generally interpreted to mean just deserts and public 
catharsis. 
According to the just deserts approach, “the retributivist 
justifies punishment by the desert of the offender.  Such desert is 
constituted by the wrong that was done by the offender and the 
culpability with which he did that wrong”.151  Based on this 
approach, “[c]riminal law exists to punish people because they 
deserve it, in proportion to their desert, and not because it causes 
some other good consequence.”152  But it is possible to argue that the 
proposed sanctioning meets the criteria of the just deserts approach 
because criminal law takes away misappropriated goods, and some 
additional amount, from the offender.  Under the proposed approach 
there is complete proportionality with the desert of the offender.  
Pritikin, who prefers restitution and fines over incarceration, argued 
that restitution is retributively satisfying because “it involves literal 
and symbolic payback.”153 
Furthermore, it is possible to argue that incarceration has little 
to do with desert: why punish financial misconduct by the denial of 
liberty?  There is no proportionality in doing so.  Similarly, Ashworth 
propose[d] that “imprisonment should not be imposed as a sentence 
for property offences” and argued that “deprivation of liberty is a 
disproportionate response for an offence that deprives people of their 
property.”154  His proposition is limited to “pure property offences” 
and excludes those “that are violent, threatening, or sexual.”155  Be-
cause the connection between incarceration and property offenses is 
tenuous, financial sanctions are a more relevant and proportional re-
sponse to property offenses, and more consistent with the retributive 
approach of just deserts.  A similar view seems to be supported by 
Morris and Tonry, who maintained that while “[t]he prison is a pun-
                                                            
151 Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 65, 69 (1999).  
152 Id. at 66. 
153 Pritikin, supra note 3, at 346. 
154 Andrew Ashworth, Foreword to What if Imprisonment were Abolished for Property Of-
fences?, in WHAT IF . . . ? SERIES OF CHALLENGING PAMPHLETS 1 (The Howard League for 




155 Id. at 3.  
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ishment exacted against freedom of movement and association; the 
fine is a punishment exacted against money and what money can 
buy.”156 
According to the catharsis approach, punishment channels 
public outrage against the breach of law.  157   It is possible to argue, 
therefore, that the general public considers the suggested financial 
sanctions to be too soft on property offenders and prefers incarcera-
tion.  A similar public attitude exists with regard to probation.  Peter-
silia claimed the public is critical of probation because it “suffers 
from a ‘soft on crime’ image” and is viewed as “permissive, uncaring 
about crime victims, and blindly advocating a rehabilitative ideal 
while ignoring the reality of violent, predatory criminals.”158  Pritikin 
noted further that as offenders are made “not only to pay money, but 
[also] to work to pay it,” the punishment should be sufficiently re-
tributive to “satisfy the public demand for retribution.”159 
In our view, however, imposing not only restitution on 
property offenders but also a fine, which leaves property offenders in 
a worse position than they were before committing the offense, may 
best achieve the goal of retribution.  Similarly, Doob and Marinos 
argued that a fine may “fail[] symbolically to denounce harm against 
the person” in violent crimes, as “society may view it as 
inappropriate because it does not serve the functions that a 
punishment is supposed to serve for that particular offense.”160  Con-
versely, fines may be more easily accepted for property offenses.161 
Indeed, in many instances convicts prefer prison over 
monetary sanctions.162  Wood and May cited numerous studies 
“showing that many offenders would prefer to serve out a prison term 
and be released with no strings attached rather than invest time in an 
                                                            
156 MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 132, at 150.  
157 Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1195, 1245 (2000); see 
also Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 440 
(2005). 
158 Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, in 22 CRIME AND JUST.: A REV. OF RES. 
149, 150 (Michael Tonry ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1997), reprinted in 22 PERSP. 30 
(1998).  
159 Pritikin, supra note 3, at 346  
160 Anthony N. Doob & Voula Marinos, Reconceptualizing Punishment: Understanding the 
Limitations on the Use of Intermediate Punishments, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH.. ROUNDTABLE 413, 
426 (1995).  
161 Pritikin, supra note 3, at 346. 
162 Pritikin, supra note 3, at 357. 
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alternative sanction” that is perceived as being easily revocable.163 
Note, however, that high moral reasoning is not a guarantee 
for moral behavior.  Kohlberg and Candee found that, notwithstand-
ing the high correlation between moral judgment and moral action, 
there is a gap between moral action and moral reasoning.164  A simi-
lar conclusion was recently reached by Brooks et al., stating, “people 
often do not act in accordance with their reasoning.”165  Therefore, 
although the proposed sentencing approach toward property offend-
ers can achieve a lower rate of recidivism, it is not a panacea for 
property offenses. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Everyday life provides ample opportunities to commit proper-
ty offenses and presents individuals with the option to respect or not 
to respect other people’s property.  To a large extent, the choice of 
whether to commit property offenses is the result of one’s moral rea-
soning, of understanding the negative moral, social, and personal im-
plications of these offenses. 
To lower reoffending rates among property offenders, it is es-
sential that criminal law makes moral correction one of its goals.  To 
attain this objective, verdicts must adopt a pro-moral correction 
stance.  They ought to express the immorality of the individual of-
fense, incorporate some kind of moral correction therapy (MRT), and 
(in most cases) impose financial sanctions rather than a custodial 
penalty.  If the offender lacks the means to meet his financial penal 
liabilities, confinement in restitution centers should be imposed. 
The significant gap between the low recidivism rates of pro-
moral correction sanctions and the high reoffending rates of incarcer-
ation indicates that monetary sanctions and restitution centers work.  
                                                            
163 David May et al., The Lesser of Two Evils? A Qualitative Study of Offenders’ Preferences 
for Prison Compared to Alternatives, 36 JOURNAL OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION 71, 86 
(2008).  
164 Marinus G.C.J. Beerthuizen & Daniel Brugman, Moral Value Evaluation: A Neglected 
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Conversely, prison, and to a lesser extent community service, are 
criminogenic.  The criminal process should therefore aim to elevate 
the moral level of property offenders through the sanctioning process, 
and in most cases forsake incarceration, which has failed to prevent 
reoffending because it does not change the offender’s low moral 
judgment.  The goal of retribution is also served in this way because 
the suggested sanctioning can lead to public catharsis, and it is pro-
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